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COMMENTS
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A BUILDING CONTRACT AND A SALE
Louisiana Civil Code article 2439 defines a sale as "an agreement
by which one gives a thing for a price in current money, and the other
gives the price in order to have the thing itself."' In contrast, article
2756 characterizes a building contract in the following way: "To build
by a plot, or to work by the job, is to undertake a building or a work
for a certain stipulated price." '2 Although these two articles appear to
identify two easily distinguished classifications of contracts, litigants and
courts alike have found "[tihe distinction between a sale and a con-
struction contract [to be] an elusive one." 3
The first part of this comment will discuss the tests developed by
both the courts and commentators to distinguish a building contract
from a sale. Specifically, two tests predominant in this inquiry will be
examined, as well as a third mode which, though infrequently used, is
quite compatible with other provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code. 4
The second part will focus upon the significance of distinguishing
the two forms of contracts, with regard to three particular issues: lib-
erative prescription, burden of proof, and remedies. As a final note,
the effects of the "New Home Warranty Act"5 will be discussed.
In order to aid the practicing lawyer, this comment will bring together
in one presentation the tests employed to distinguish between a sale and
building contract, as well as arguments for and against each of these
tests. It should be noted that these tests are not inflexible. Courts have
tended to take a result-oriented approach. 6 Attorneys should formulate
their contentions and prepare their defenses accordingly.
I. THE DISTINCTION AND ITS TESTS
A. The Fundamental Obligation Test
In a typical case in which this distinction is relevant, one party
contracts to bestow upon another an object the bestowal of which
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. Civ. Code art. 2439.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 2756.
3. Holden v. Placid Oil Co., 512 F. Supp. 644, 646 (E.D. La. 1981).
4. La. Civ. Code arts. 490-498.
5. La. R.S. 9:3141 to :3150 (Supp. 1987).
6. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 13-16, 29-33, 69-72.
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requires some service, labor, or skill to be rendered by the first party.
Within this one contract the first party is bound to perform at least
two different obligations-obligations to give and to do.7 Sales are
governed by the Civil Code articles concerning obligations to give,
whereas building contracts are governed by the articles concerning ob-
ligations to do.' Taken separately, these obligations present no issue of
classification. The situation complicates considerably, however, when
these obligations are related within one contract.
Recognizing the frequent interrelation between obligations to do and
obligations to give, Louisiana courts have devised what will hereinafter
be referred to as the "fundamental obligation" test as a means of
classifying the contract in question. Professor Litvinoff has concisely
stated that test as follows: "When different obligations are intimately
connected . .. one of them must be recognized as fundamental and if
it is one to do, for instance, the whole contract will be treated as giving
rise to obligations of that kind." 9 A clearer understanding of this test
can be achieved by examining a series of cases in which it was used.
The case of Papa v. Louisiana Metal Awning Co.'0 involved a
contract requiring the defendant to make and install an aluminum patio
cover to be attached to the plaintiff's house. The cover was specially
designed to fit the dimensions of plaintiff's house and patio. After
installing the cover, the defendant was paid in full. The following day
several minor leaks were discovered during a rainstorm. As a result of
these leaks and other minor defects, the plaintiff sued for rescission of
the contract.
The defendant in Papa had contracted to assume two obligations.
One was to deliver or transfer to the defendant a patio cover; the other
was to build and install this cover. The former is properly termed an
obligation to give, the latter, an obligation to do.
Affirming the trial court's decision in favor of the defendant, the
second circuit relied heavily on the facts that the cover was "designed,
7. See La. Civ. Code art. 1756.
8. While all sales are obligations to give, not all obligations to give are sales.
Similarly, while all building contracts are obligations to do, not all obligations to do are
building contracts.
Furthermore, the term "building contract" is not restricted to agreements involving
buildings. Thus, that term has been applied to agreements involving such objects as
dentures (Martin v. Rome, 486 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (Lanier, J., concurring));
carpeting (Acadiana Health Club, Inc. v. Hebert, 469 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1985)); chimneys (Martin v. AAA Brick Co., 386 So. 2d 987 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980));
and display cases (Henson v. Gonzalez, 326 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976)).
9. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 157, at 288, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975).
10. 131 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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fabricated and erected by [the] defendants,"" that it was designed spe-
cifically for the dimensions of the plaintiff's house, and that it was
permanently attached to the house. The court concluded that the contract
was "more than a mere sale of materials[, as] [i]t involved primarily
the furnishing of labor and the contractor's skill in the performance of
the job.' ' 2 Finding that the obligation to do was fundamental, the court
classified the contract as a building contract.
A second case illustrating the fundamental obligation test is Ras-
mussen v. Cashio Concrete Corp.'3 In June, 1981, the defendant fur-
nished the plaintiff with a 5.58-ton home sewer treatment plant. Two
months later sewage overflowed into the house as a result of the failure
of the plant. At least thirteen other embarrassing and unfortunate events
occurred over the next three years. In September, 1983, the plaintiff,
obviously alleging a contract of sale, filed suit in redhibition' 4 asking
for the cost of repairs as well as other damages. The first circuit found
that the actionable defect resulted from faulty installation." This finding
of a defect in the service rendered, rather than in the object itself,
would seem to support an action for the breach of a building contract,
not an action in redhibition. Yet, the court cohcluded that the contract
was a sale. In support of its conclusion the court stated as follows:
We recognize that a defect in installation results from an
inadequate performance of a service. But this fact does not
transform the transaction in question from a sale into a contract
to do. The primary object of the agreement between the parties
was the provision of a functioning sewer treatment plant. The
installing of this 5.58-ton unit was secondary, ancillary, to that
object, and the contract is best characterized as one of sale.
Thus the Civil Code articles on redhibition are appropriate. 6
The court in Rasmussen utilized the fundamental obligation test to
reach a conclusion which favored the plaintiff. Refusing to follow a
strict, inflexible application of the test, the court apparently preferred
to "bend" the test to reach what it believed to be a more just result.
Rasmussen illustrates the judiciary's tendency towards a result-oriented
application of the fundamental obligation test.
An Economics Approach
Determining which obligation is "fundamental" can be an abstract
and speculative task. For this reason Louisiana courts have often resorted
II. Id. at 117.
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. 484 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
14. See La. Civ. Code art. 2520. Redhibition is a remedy applicable only to sales.
15. Rasmussen, 484 So. 2d at 778.
16. Id.
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to consideration of certain economic factors to facilitate application of
the fundamental obligation test. Professor Levasseur has correctly noted:
On several occasions, the Louisiana courts have followed this
approach of weighing the economics of the situation and have
ruled that the contract was a sale or a hiring of industry whenever
they were satisfied that the "primary obligation" was one to
give and the "accessory obligation" was one to do or vice versa.17
Thus, courts have weighed the cost and the value of the obligation to
do against the cost and the value of the obligation to give. The obligation
which is "fundamental" is the one having the greatest weight in this
inquiry.
In KSLA-TV, Inc. v. Radio Corp.,, a Louisiana federal district
court had the opportunity to decide whether a contract was a building
contract or a sale, and used the fundamental obligation test supported
by this economics approach. In this case, KSLA-TV hired RCA to
construct a television antenna tower. RCA engaged Stainless, Inc., to
design and fabricate the tower, and to hire another subcontractor to
install it. Construction was completed in November, 1964. In October
of 1977, the tower collapsed, and KSLA-TV filed suit in redhibition
against RCA and Stainless. In its motion for summary judgment, Stain-
less asserted that the contract between KSLA-TV and RCA was a building
contract.
The court noted that the contract in question placed upon the
defendants obligations to do in designing, fabricating, and erecting the
tower, and an obligation to give in transferring its ownership. 9 The
court saw the task before it as having to determine which obligation
was fundamental, a process which it recognized as one often entailing
an examihation of the economic factors involved in performance of the
contract. 20 If the value and/or cost of the obligation to do is "trifling"
when compared to the value and/or cost of the obligation to give, said
the court, then the fundamental obligation is to give and the contract
is one of sale. Yet, if the cost of the obligation to do is more than a
"trifling" aspect of the agreement, then a building contract exists. 2'
With these principles in mind, the court reasoned that "[w]hen one
17. Levasseur, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-
Sales, 39 La. L. Rev. 705, 712-13 (1979).
18. 501 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. La. 1980), aff'd, 693 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1982). On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Judge Stagg's opinion and adopted it as their own,
but remanded the case so that the trial court could consider two new issues not relevant
to the subject matter of this Comment.
19. Id. at 894.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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considers the value of the fabrication and design in conjunction with
the cost of erection, there is no question that the contract 'involved
primarily the furnishing of labor and the contractor's skill in the per-
formance of the job.' '22 Additionally, the court found "it ...absurd
to suggest that a 1,709-foot, 7-inch television tower was 'purchased' and
was then 'installed' at a relatively trifling cost upon KSLA's property.12
Thus, the court utilized the fundamental obligation test supplemented
by .balancing of economic factors to hold that the contract was a
building contract.2 4
The KSLA-TV approach received similar application in Martin v.
Rome, 5 a recent case in which the defendant was sued for dental
malpractice arising from an agreement to provide dentures. Noting that
the major portion of the defendant's fee was for his services 6 and that
the taking of impressions of the plaintiff's gums was the first step in
the manufacturing of the dentures,- the court found the agreement to
be a building contract. Furthermore, the court seemed to suggest that
the "installation"-an obligation to do-was more than a trifling aspect
of the contract. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the court
used the economics approach to the fundamental obligation test, though
it did not expressly label its analysis as such.28
The KSLA-TV analysis was modified somewhat by the second circuit
in Austin's, Inc. v. Brown. 9 The plaintiff corporation sought to purchase
cash registers for a restaurant soon to be opened. The defendant pro-
posed, and the plaintiff agreed to, a computer system which performed
many.other tasks in addition to a cash register function. The contract
required the defendant to provide computer hardware along with pro-
gramming and training. The total price of the contract was $9,810, of
which $2,830 was for the programming and training. The system was
installed and the cash register function operated satisfactorily; however,
the defendant's attempt to write a program which adequately performed
the other agreed upon tasks was unsuccessful. As a result, the defendant
offered to refund the plaintiff's down payment or to replace the system
with something more conventional. The plaintiff refused both offers.
Five months after the restaurant's timely opening the plaintiff brought,
suit requesting specific performance or general damages.
22. Id. at 896 (emphasis in original) (quoting Papa, 131 So.92d at 117).
23. Id. at 895.
24. Id. at 896.
25. 486 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
26. Id. at 216.
27. Id. at 215.
28. Id.
29. 474 So. 2d 1383 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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In affirming the lower court's classification of the contract as a
sale, the court reasoned that although the contract required the defendant
to provide extensive programming and training, because the cost of those
services comprised only one-fifth of the total cost, the fundamental
obligation was to give. a"
This analysis represents an interesting modification to the approach
taken in KSLA-TV under which, if the obligation to do constitutes more
than a "trifling" aspect of the agreement in terms of its cost or value,
then the entire contract is to be characterized as a building contract.3
This "more than trifling" standard would seem to weigh heavily in
favor of the litigant who seeks to convince a court that a building
contract was formed. The court in Austin's, Inc. did not adhere strictly
to this standard; rather, the court admitted that the obligation to do,
which accounted for over twenty percent of the total price, was extensive,
but still classified the contract as one of sale. Apparently, the court
placed the obligation to do and the obligation to give on a more equal
footing than in the approach taken in KSLA-TV, in that, whichever
obligation outweighed the other prevailed. The following statement by
the court supports this analysis:
[The defendant's] obligation to design, program, install, and
train the restaurant employees to operate, [sic] the system is
more than trifling installation of a thing sold. These obligations
to do, however, . . . while somewhat substantial, do not negate
the characterization of the contract as a sale, which imposes
the obligation to give or to deliver.32
Though both variations of the economics approach are viable, it is
suggested that the KSLA-TV notion is the more accepted theory.3
B. The Duhon Test
Another approach to distinguishing a sale from a building contract
was developed by the third circuit in Duhon v. Three Friends Home-
builders Corp.34 The plaintiffs in Duhon contracted with the defendant
for the construction of a home. Under the agreement, the plaintiffs
were to select a floor plan, color scheme, and appliances. The defendant
agreed to build the house and move it, completed, to the plaintiff's lot.
After the house was moved, the plaintiffs noticed several major defects
30. Id. at 1387-88.
31. See discussion of KSLA-TV in text accompanying supra notes 18-24.
32. 474 So. 2d at 1387.
33. See, e.g., Hunt v. Suares, 9 La. 434 (1836); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Schega, 362
So. 2d 1128 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
34. 396 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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and filed a suit in redhibition to rescind the contract and recover the
price paid. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that the contract was one to build and not one of sale, and
that therefore the suit in redhibition was improper. In approaching the
problem of classification, the third circuit reasoned that three factors
determine whether a transaction is a sale or a building contract. First,
in a building contract the party receiving the performance has some
control over the specifications of the object.35 Second, negotiations in
a building contract "take place before the object is constructed. ' 3 6
Finally, "and perhaps most importantly, a building contract contemplates
not only that one party will supply the materials, but also that that
party will furnish his skill and labor in order to build the desired
object." 37 Finding that the contract at issue met each of these tests, the
court concluded that the agreement was a building contract and upheld
the trial court's ruling dismissing the plaintiff's suit in redhibition. 38
Cases applying the test adopted in Duhon include Trahan v.
Broussard' 9 and Degeneres v. Burgess.4° In Trahan, the defendant con-
tracted with the plaintiff to add pool and game rooms to the latter's
house. The defendant convinced the plaintiff not to hire an architect
and designed the addition himself. Twenty-one months after the room
was completed, the walls collapsed, and the plaintiff filed suit alleging
breach of a building contract and, in the alternative, redhibition.
The third circuit utilized the Duhon method of classification, and
found that all three elements of a building contract existed: the plaintiff
had input into the specifications; the parties negotiated the transaction
prior to construction; and the defendant contributed his skill and labor
in addition to the materials in rendering his performance.
4
1
The facts of Degeneres are slightly more complicated. In September,
1977, LaRussa Enterprises contracted with Burgess to build a house on
LaRussa's land and in accordance with LaRussa's plans, but subject to
certain modifications required by Burgess. During construction Burgess
noticed leakage problems and elicited a promise from LaRussa to repair
them. After completion of construction an act of sale was passed between
LaRussa and Burgess in June of 1978. In April of 1979, Burgess sold
the house to the plaintiffs. Prior to moving in, the plaintiffs discovered
serious leakage problems, and, in June of 1980, after having contended
with the leakage problems for over a year, the plaintiffs filed suit for
35. Id. at 561.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 399 So. 2d 782 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
40. 486 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
41. Trahan, 399 So. 2d at 784.
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the breach of a building contract against both Burgess and LaRussa.
The lower court decided in favor of the plaintiffs over LaRussa, but
in favor of Burgess over the plaintiffs. Only LaRussa appealed.
The result of the appeal turned largely upon the proper classification
of the contract between LaRussa and Burgess. 42 If the contract were
found to be a sale, then the plaintiff's suit would be barred by the one
year prescriptive period for actions in redhibition. This period would
have commenced upon discovery of the leaks. 43 If, however, the contract
were found to be a building contract, the plaintiffs' suit would have
been timely."
Following the Duhon three-factor test, the court classified the agree-
ment as a building contract. Burgess had inserted modifications into the
house plans (factor one) through negotiations conducted prior to the
house's construction (factor two), and the defendant had agreed to supply
both the materials and the labor necessary to build the house (factor
three).
At present, the Duhon test is a popular and well-established means
of distinguishing between a building contract and a sale. 45 Moreover,
though the Duhon decision was rendered less than a decade ago, the
test created therein contains elements supported by prior jurisprudence
as relevant to making the classification under consideration. 4
42. The contract at issue was not that between the plaintiff and Burgess, but the
one between LaRussa and Burgess. This is because the plaintiff was allowed to subrogate
himself to the rights of Burgess. As Burgess' rights against LaRussa were dependent on
the contract's classification, so stood the plaintiff's rights. In deciding the subrogation
question the court reasoned that since redhibition allows a purchaser to assert the rights
of his seller against the seller's vendor, then, by analogy, a subsequent purchaser ought
to be entitled to assert the rights of his seller against a prior contractor. Degeneres, 486
So. 2d at 774.
43. See La. Civ. Code art. 2546.
44. See La. Civ. Code art. 2762.
45. In addition to those cases previously discussed, see Hebert v. McDaniel, 479 So.
2d 1029 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Acadiana Health Club, Inc. v. Hebert, 469 So. 2d
1186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Strecker v. Credico Fin., Inc., 444 So. 2d 783 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1984).
46. The case of Wurst v. Pruyn, 250 La. 1109, 202 So. 2d 268 (1967), involved a
contract for the construction of a house. Over five years after that agreement the plaintiffs
filed suit alleging breach of the building contract. The cause of this suit was a cracked
foundation. In finding that the plaintiffs' suit had not prescribed, the Louisiana Supreme
Court concluded that the agreement in question was a building contract. This conclusion
was based in part on the facts that (a) the building plans had been modified at the
request of the plaintiffs and (b) the agreement was reached at the beginning of construction.
The first of these factors is reflected in the first element of the Duhon test which states
that the party receiving the performance shall have some control over the specifications
of the object. The second factor could reasonably be interpreted as a forerunner of the
second element of Duhon which concerns whether negotiations for the contract occurred
[Vol. 47
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Having considered the fundamental obligation test and the Duhon
test independently, the next stage of analysis is to evaluate each in light
of the other.
C. A Comparative Analysis
An assessment of the comparative worth of each of the aforemen-
tioned tests must focus upon one basic principle of contract interpre-
tation-that a court's primary objective in the classification and
construction of a contract should be to give effect to the intentions of
the parties at the time of contracting. With this in mind, the following
assertions are made.
As previously discussed, the fundamental obligation test without
benefit of economic balancing is often abstract and impracticable to
apply.4 7 An important issue arises, however, as to whether a balancing
of the cost and/or value of the obligation to do against the cost and/
or the value of the obligation to give effectively reflects the parties'
intentions at the time of contracting. Professor Levasseur argues that
it does not:
A reliance on a value test is an appealing one because of its
simplicity and its mathematical objectivity. It pays little attention,
however, to the realities of the contractual process where men
bargain by means of words which too often do not reflect their
intimate feelings and intent .48
The fundamental obligation test, as supplemented by the economics
approach, fails to consider the parties' intentions. This failure is borne
prior to construction.
In the case of Mangin v. Jorgens, 24 So. 2d 384 (La. App. Orl. 1946), the plaintiff
sued for the balance owed on the transfer and installation of four floor heaters of a
particular brand. Because of minor defects, the defendant reconvened for rescission of
what he claimed was a sale. The court found that a building contract, and not a sale,
existed, reasoning that the contract "invovled [sic] more than a mere sale of materials,
i.e., the furnishing of labor and the contractor's skill in the performance of the job."
Id. at 386.
The similarity between the court's statement and the third element of the Duhon test
is unmistakable, though the cases are arguably distinguishable. In Duhon, the contractor
provided skill and labor to build the object desired; in Mangin, on the other hand, the
plaintiff only contracted to furnish and install heaters built by another. This distinction
is of doubtful import, however, in light of the following statement by Judge McCaleb
in Mangin: "This, while not a contract to build a house, is a construction contract as
it contemplated erection and installation .... " Id. Thus, although an argument can be
made to the contrary, there is a sound basis for the proposition that the third factor of
the Duhon method of classification was also established in the jurisprudence prior to the
Duhon decision.
47. See text accompanying supra note 23.
48. Levasseur, supra note 17, at 713.
19871
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out by its application. The courts which have subscribed to this notion
have tended to find a building contract rather than a sale. 49 This tendency
suggests that the courts have been content to use a mechanical decision-
making process, rather than one which considers the intent of the parties
in each individual case.
Arguably, the three factors of the Duhon test present more satisfying
grounds for classification. These factors raise three factually-oriented
questions which explore the circumstances of the parties' actions and
their expectations. Element one considers what the parties actually agreed
to by looking to who participated in considering the specifications of
the object. Element two determines when, relative to the creation of
the object, the parties engaged in negotiations. Element three is concerned
with how the parties expected the contract to be carried out. Thus, the
Duhon test requires a judicial evaluation of the circumstances and ex-
pectations of the agreement which will in turn reflect the intentions of
the parties.
Nevertheless, like the fundamental obligation test, the Duhon test
is open to criticism. For instance, if element two-consideration of when
the agreement was reached-is viewed in isolation, it fails to distinguish
a building contract from a sale of a future thing. 0
In addition, one can argue that element three does not help distin-
guish between a building contract and a sale; it only answers whether
a distinction needs to be made. If element three is not satisfied (i.e.,
if the contract does not contemplate that one party would use skill and
labor as well as supply materials), then no issue of classification arises.
This is so because if the contract involves only obligations to do or
only obligations to give, then the interrelation of obligations which gives
rise to a dispute over the contract's classification does not exist.
In the end, however, it must be emphasized that both tests have
generally led to fair and accurate results." While there have been ex-
49. See text accompanying supra notes 31-33.
50. Consider a hypothetical. A desires three display cases like one he saw in a picture.
He offers to pay B to produce these display cases, the latter accepts, and a contract is
formed. Element two considered alone would require the contract to be classified as a
building contract, even though there is reason to believe a contract for the sale of a
future thing exists. Of course, the obvious antithesis to this argument is that neither the
elements of the Duhon analysis nor the facts of a real case are considered in isolation.
For the final disposition of a case similar to the hypothetical above, see Henson v.
Gonzalez, 326 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (a pre-Duhon case which relied in
part on the fact that negotiations were completed prior to the building of the display
cases to classify the agreement as a building contract).
51. See, e.g., Degeneres v. Burgess, 486 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Austin's,
Inc. v. Brown, 474 So. 2d 1385 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Henson v. Gonzalez, 326 So.
2d 396 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Papa v. Louisiana Metal Awning Co., 131 So. 2d 114
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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ceptions in which courts have utilized one test or the other to reach
surprising results5 2 on the whole, each approach has provided a means
to distinguish effectively and predictably between building contracts and
sales.
Despite these comments favorable to both tests, it is worthwhile to
consider a third worthy, but often overlooked, test.
D. The Accession Test
The accession test can be grounded in the following theory: if the
object of the contract is to be built upon the land of the "owner"
rather than the builder, then the contract is a building contract-not a
sale-regardless of which party has the obligation to supply the materials.
This theory may be derived from the following excerpts from Planiol:
The contract which has as an object a future thing is not a
sale, if the thing is to be produced by the labor of the promisor.53
If the creation of the thing to be delivered depends on the work
of the promisor (or of workmen under his orders), the contract
has no longer as object only the alienation of a thing; it includes
in addition the remuneration by the job of a work to be ef-
fectuated; it forms therefore a mixed transaction being at the
same time sale and contract by the job.14
It follows, that when the contractor undertakes to construct a
house on land which is delivered to him by his client, the
agreement is (under the jurisprudence) a lease and not a sale,
because the land is considered as the principle part of the thing,
the building is only an accessory.5"
Professor Levasseur has noted that Pothier proposed a comparable
idea:
"The bargain that I have made with an undertaker whereby
he is to build me a house is no less a contract of hiring of
52. See FMC Corp. v. Continental Grain Co., 355 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1977), withdrawn, 356 So. 2d 1001 (La. 1977), wherein the court held that a contract to
design, engineer, fabricate, and install a huge grain barge unloading system was a sale.
This case has been criticized by courts and commentators alike. See Gulf States Utils.
Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1981), and Levasseur, supra note 17, at
715 (1979). An appeal of this decision was withdrawn as a result of the parties settling
the dispute.
53. 2 M. Planiol, Trait6 tl~mentaire de Droit Civil No. 1902, at 142 (11th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
54. Id. at 143.
55. Id. at 143 n.7 (citation omitted).
1987]
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industry, even though by the terms of our contract he is to
furnish the materials, because the land which I furnish for the
erection of the house, is the principle thing in a house." 5 6
Professor Levasseur explains Pothier's theory of classification in the
following way:
This attribute of the ownership of the things added, joined, or
incorporated into the property is founded on the maxim "ac-
cessorium sequitur principale." By application of this principle
it does not matter whether the improvements, additions, or
erections were made with materials that belong to the proprietor
or the undertaker or a third party-regardless of their origin
they belong to the proprietor of the immovable by accession.17
The ideas of the above three commentators can be consolidated to
arrive at the following line of reasoning: under the law of accession,
ownership of the materials used to build the object of the contract
becomes vested in the landowner prior to performance of the contract
in question. Thus, when performance occurs, the contractor contributes
only his skill and labor; he does not transfer the ownership of the
materials or the newly-built object, because he can not-ownership is
already vested in the landowner. Since a sale requires the transfer of
ownership of some thing, 8 it is not possible that the contract is a sale.
Therefore, the contract must be classified as a building contract.5 9
One argument against the accession theory would be to cite Louisiana
Civil Code article 2456 for the proposition that the sale of the goods
came into existence prior to their delivery to the land of the party
receiving the performance. 60 Such an argument, however, would be based
upon the erroneous assumption that the materials required to build the
56. Levasseur, supra note 17, at 714 (quoting R. Pothier, Traitd du Contrat de Louage
et Trait6 des Cheptels § 394, as contained in Oeuvres de Pothier (1806) (A. Levasseur
trans.)).
57. Id. at 714.
58. See La. Civ. Code art. 2439.
59. This analysis parallels that of a situation in which the owner purchases the
materials himself and then hires the contractor to build the object. Once the contractor
finishes building the object and the owner pays him, can it be said that the contractor
fulfilled any obligation to give? Certainly not. Since at the time of the execution of the
contract the contractor did not own the materials, he could not transfer the ownership
of the materials of the resulting object. There being no transfer of ownership, there can
be so sale. Only an obligation to do was performed; therefore, the contract must have
been a building contract.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 2456 states:
The sale is considered to be perfect between the parties, and the property is
of right acquired to the purchaser with regard to the seller, as soon as there
exists an agreement for the object and for the price thereof, although the object
has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid.
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object are themselves the object(s) of the contract. The object is, rather,
the house, swimming pool, patio, etc. which has not yet come into
existence when the materials to build it (e.g., nails, lumber, shingles,
concrete, etc.) are placed upon the land of the party receiving the
performance. Louisiana Civil Code article 2439, in defining a sale,
requires consent, a price and an object. The materials, unassembled,
are simply not the object.
At least one Louisiana case explicitly supports the accession theory.
In Parker v. Brown6 the court expressly relied upon the fact that the
construction occurred on the land of the party receiving the performance
in finding the agreement to be a building contract. The contract required
the defendant to build a house for the plaintiff on a lot owned by the
plaintiff. More than one year after the performance of the contract,
the plaintiff sued for damages arising from certain defects in the con-
struction. Brown's principal defense was that the one-year liberative
prescription under redhibition had run. Judge Ayres, writing for the
second circuit, held that the one-year liberative prescription of redhibition
was inapplicable, as the contract was "a construction contract wherein
defendant agreed to construct a dwelling for plaintiff . . . on a certain-
described lot owned by plaintiff. '62
Other Louisiana courts required to classify a transaction as a sale
or a building contract have reached decisions which are consistent in
result with the accession theory. In each of these cases63 the factual
setting involved the construction of some object on the land of the party
receiving the performance. In none of these cases, however, did the
court arrive at the conclusion that the agreement was a building contract
through reasoning which required consideration of which party owned
land on which the construction occurred. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that this theory of classification is not inconsistent with the
results reached in these cases.
It is thus reasonable to conclude that there is both express and
implied support for the accession theory in Louisiana law. Furthermore,
61. 150 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
62. Id. at 307.
63. See, e.g., KSLA-TV, Inc. v. Radio Corp., 501 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. La. 1980);
Airco Refrigeration Serv. v. Fink, 242 La. 73, 134 So. 2d 880 (1961); Acadiana Health
Club, Inc. v. Hebert, 469 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Trahan v. Broussard,
399 So. 2d 782 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Bel v. Capital Properties, Inc., 357 So. 2d 1330
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 359 So. 2d 1306 (La. 1978); Catalina Pools v. Sellers,
322 So. 2d 812 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Long Leaf Lumber, Inc. v. Summer Grove
Developers, Inc., 270 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); A. A. Home Improvement
Co. v. Irwin, 203 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Papa v. Louisiana Metal Awning
Co., 131 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Mangin v. Jorgens, 24 So. 2d 384 (La.
App. Orl. 1946); and St. Mary Iron Works v. Community Mfg. Enter., 9 La. App. 743,
119 So. 564 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929).
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this test is easy to administer and would result in consistent, predictable
decisions. Nevertheless, as with the fundamental obligation and the
Duhon tests, this approach is not without its limitations. The most
notable drawback of the accession test is that it provides no guidance
if the construction occurs on the land of the builder. Is it proper to
reason a contrario that because the construction occurred on the builder's
land, the agreement is a sale and not a building contract? Such a
conclusion appears unwarranted.
A second shortcoming of the accession test may be that it has been
applied only to immovables. Whether courts will be willing to apply
this test to movables is unknown. An opportunity for such application
may exist where, for instance, an owner contracts with another for a
new floor in his mobile home.
In addition to these two limitations, there are two other problems
with the accession view. Because it is applied mechanically to certain
particular factual settings the intentions of the parties are likely to be
ignored. Lastly, from a practical perspective, both the Duhon and the
fundamental obligation tests are widely used to classify contracts and
have generally produced just results. 64 There is little practical necessity
for a third test.
E. Conclusion of Part I
Each of the three modes of distinguishing between a building contract
and a sale has its own unique advantages and disadvantages. All three
tests should be recognized as valid foundations for argument. Both the
fundamental obligation and Duhon tests are presently in active use by
the Louisiana courts and are producing just results. Because the Duhon
test involves factually-oriented and efficiently administered elements which
generally reflect the intentions of the parties and which produce justified
conclusions, it is suggested as the best approach of the three.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN A SALE AND A
BUILDING CONTRACT
The distinction between a building contract and a sale affects the
rights and obligations of the parties at every stage of judicial consid-
eration. Under the appropriate circumstances the distinction will mate-
rially affect whether the plaintiff can maintain a suit, whether the
plaintiff will prevail, and the nature and extent of the recovery. Thus,
the impact of the distinction will be examined with respect to issues of
liberative prescription, burden of proof, and remedies, respectively.
64. See supra note 51.
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A. Liberative Prescription
The time limit within which a plaintiff must bring a suit in redhi-
bition is one year from the date of sale unless the seller is presumed
to know of the defect, in which case the suit prescribes within one year
of the plaintiff's discovery of the defect. 65 In contrast, a party to a
building contract must file suit within five years, if the defective building
is made of wood, or ten years, if the building was constructed of stone
or brick.
66
Broussard v. Pierret6" provides a typical example of the prescriptive
issue. In that case, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant
for the latter to construct a house on the defendant's land. The house
was completed and an act of sale was executed in 1962. Thereafter,
defects in the sheetrock were discovered. Though the defendant made
several attempts at repair, the defects remained, and the plaintiff filed
suit in 1965. The defendant alleged that the suit had prescribed due to
the expiration of the one-year prescriptive period applicable to sales.
Judge Tate, writing for the third circuit, found a building contract rather
than a sale to exist. "[T]he purchaser's right to recover damages for
defective performance is subject to the ten-year building-contracts pre-
scription of LSA-Civil Code Article 2762, not the one-year sales pre-
scription of LSA-Civil Code Article 2534."68 Thus, the plaintiff's suit
had not prescribed.
An interesting result-oriented case is Hill v. John L. Crosby, Inc.69
The defendant built a house with the intention of selling it to any
purchaser. In October, 1969, the plaintiffs bought the house. By 1971
65. La. Civ. Code art. 2534 states in part: "The redhibitory action must be instituted
within a year, at the farthest, commencing from the date of the sale. This limitation does
not apply where the seller had knowledge of the vice and neglected to declare it to the
purchaser."
La. Civ. Code art. 2646 states in part: "[When the seller has not disclosed his knowledge
of the vice,] the action for redhibition may be commenced at any time, provided a year
has not elapsed since the'discovery of the vice."
66. La. Civ. Code art. 2762 states:
If a building, which an architect or other workman has undertaken to make
by the job, shall fall to ruin either in whole or in part, on account of the
badness of the workmanship, the architect or undertaker shall bear the loss if
the building falls to ruin in the course of ten years, if it be a stone or brick
building, and of five years if it be built in wood or with frames filled with
bricks.
One should also be aware of the ten-year peremptive period which runs in favor of
those who perform services on immovable property or to improvements thereon. See La.
R.S. 9:2772 (Supp. 1987).
67. 215 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
68. Id. at 138.
69. 353 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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they discovered severe mildewing and rotting in one section of the house;
however, it was not until August, 1974 that they arranged for laboratory
analysis of the problems. This analysis concluded that the defects were
the result of the defendant's faulty workmanship. The plaintiffs then
filed suit for damages in October, 1974. The court of appeals hesitated
to find this to be a sale, 70 recognizing that to do so would bar the
plaintiffs' suit. The majority stated its dissatisfaction with the present
law by noting: "We are reluctant to accept a thesis whereby a home
purchaser who buys a so-called speculative house finds himself with far
more limited rights than one who has a house built to his own plans. ''71
To avoid barring the suit and still correctly classify the contract,
the court held that the one-year prescription did not begin to run until
August, 1974, when the plaintiffs discovered the cause of the defect.1
2
The dissent correctly noted, however, that the one-year period began to
run at discovery of the defect, not its cause. Since the defect was
discovered in 1971, the dissent concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint
should have been dismissed.
73
Hill should be taken as an illustration of the courts' occasional
willingness to disregard established law in favor of a more just result.
Broussard and the code articles cited therein are accurate authority for
resolving issues of liberative prescription for building contracts and sales.
B. Burden of Proof
Under article 276974 the contractor in a building contract, upon
proving that he substantially, though not completely, performed his
obligations, can recover the contract price minus that amount shown
by the owner to be required to complete the performance owed. In a
sale, however, the seller must deliver or tender delivery of the object
(that is, he must completely fulfill his obligations) before he can recover
the price. 75 How the contract in question is classified, therefore, deter-
mines what the party furnishing the object contracted for must prove
in order to prevail at trial. If a contract is classified as a building
contract, the owner then has the burden of proving what will be required
to complete the job so that he may reduce the price in accordance with
70. Id. at 423 n.2.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 423.
73. Id. at 424 (Schott, J., dissenting).
74. Article 2769 states:
If an undertaker fails to do the work he has contracted to do, or if he does
not execute it in the manner and at the time he has agreed to do it, he shall
be liable in damages for the losses that may ensue from his non-compliance
with his contract.
75. See La. Civ. Code art. 2551.
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the contractor's substantial performance. If the contract is a sale, then
the seller must prove delivery, or tender of delivery, in order to recover
the price. Thus, distinguishing between a building contract and a sale
affects the burden of proof.76
This difference is illustrated in A. A. Home Improvement Co. v.
Irwin.77 Extending from the floor of the defendants' back porch half
way up to the ceiling was a weatherboard wainscoting. The plaintiff
was hired to enclose the porch by installing windows from the wain-
scoting to the ceiling. The plaintiff performed the work, but the defend-
ants refused to pay, alleging leakage and other defects in the plaintiff's
workmanship. The plaintiff sued for the contract price and offered
evidence at trial which sufficiently proved that, while some defects did
exist, there had been substantial performance. The trial court dismissed
the plaintiff's suit without prejudice.
The court of appeals reversed, reasoning as follows:
[Tihe law governing building and construction contracts is dif-
ferent from that which generally governs commutative contracts,
where there can be no recovery in the absence of full and
complete performance. However, the doctrine of substantial com-
pliance is sufficient to justify recovery of the contract price by
the plaintiff. The owner's remedy in the presence of a substantial
compliance or performance of the contract is to allege and prove
the nature and extent of the unfinished or defective work, so
as to reduce the amount of the plaintiff's judgment by the
amount of the cost required to correct the defective work. The
burden of proof in a case of this nature as to the defects and
omissions on the part of the contractor and the cost of repairing
and finishing them lies squarely upon the owners who claim
that defective work exists.7 1
The plaintiff recovered the contract price minus whatever amount the
trial court determined on remand to be necessary to correct the defects. 79
76. See Airco Refrigeration Serv., Inc. v. Fink, 242 La. 73, 134 So. 2d 880 (1961);
Henson v. Gonzalez, 326 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Nichols Ford Co. v.
Hughes, 292 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
77. 203 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
78. Id. at 890.
79. In cases clearly involving a sale (i.e., where no issue of classification exists),
Louisiana courts have utilized the device of quanti minoris to reduce the amount of the
purchase price owed. The burden of proving the defect and the amount of reduction
under this approach is properly on the purchaser. In such a situation the burden of proof
is substantially similar to that provided for by article 2769. Thus, to the extent that
quanti minoris is applicable, the difference in burden of proof in building contracts and
sales loses significance. For examples of application of quanti minoris in this context,
see, e.g., Lemonier v. Coco, 237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436 (1959) (sale of lot and house);
Guillory v. Petre Ford Co., 345 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (sale of automobile).
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C. Remedies
Of great advantage to the buyer in a suit in redhibition is the ability
to collect attorney's fees. This item of recovery is authorized by article
254580 which is applicable only to actions in redhibition.8' A plaintiff
who prevails in an action brought for the breach of a building contract
cannot be granted such relief.
In Rasmussen v. Cashio Concrete Corp.82 the plaintiff filed suit for
a defective sewer treatment plant, seeking damages and attorney's fees.
The first circuit classified the contract as one of sale and upheld the
lower court's decision in favor of the plaintiff.83 By classifying the
contract as a sale the court was able to apply article 2545 and allow
the plaintiff to recover attorney's fees. Again, attorney's fees would not
have been recoverable had the court concluded that a building contract
existed.
D. New Legislation: The "New Home Warranty Act"
The Louisiana Legislature has recently designated one class of trans-
actions as to which classification as a sale or building contract will be
irrelevant. Entitled the "New Home Warranty Act, '8 4 this legislation
applies only to transactions involving newly-constructed buildings used
primarily for residential purposes.85 Excluded are all transactions in-
volving objects that are not buildings or buildings that are to be used
for some non-residential purpose. The statute also does not affect trans-
actions involving improvements, additions, or alterations to an already-
existing "home.' '86
80. La. Civ. Code art. 2545 states: "The seller, who knows the vice of the thing he
sells and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of price and repayment of the expenses,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, is answerable to the buyer in damages."
81. "[The distinction between a building contract and a sale] has relevance to the
discussion of ... attorney's fees that follows. LSA-C.C. art. 2545 and the jurisprudence
interpreting it have application only to actions in redhibition." Rasmussen, 484 So. 2d
at 778 n.2.
82. 484 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986). For a discussion of Rasmussen in the
context of the fundamental obligation test, see text accompanying supra notes 13-16.
83. Rasmussen, 484 So. 2d at 779-80.
84. La. R.S. 9:3141 to :3150 (Supp. 1987).
85. La. R.S. 9:3143(3) (Supp. 1987) defines a "home" as "any new structure designed
and used only for residential use." Further, La. R.S. 9:3144(B)(12) excludes from the
coverage of this act "[any loss or damage which arises while the home is being used
primarily for a nonresidential purpose."
86. This exclusion is implied from a general reading of the entire act, but particularly
from La. R.S. 9:3141 (Supp. 1987) and 9:3143(7) (Supp. 1987) in conjunction with
9:3144(A) (Supp. 1987). La. R.S. 9:3141 expresses the purpose of the act as being in
part the promotion of commerce "by providing clear, concise, and mandatory warranties
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While the act is limited in scope, it does provide the "exclusive
remedies, warranties, and prescriptive periods ' 8 7 for those transactions
which it covers. Thus, the act's provisions as to prescription, warranties,
and remedies will apply regardless of the contract's classification as a
sale or a building contract.
The act provides for the following warranties (subject to certain
exclusions):
(1) One year following the warranty commencement date, the
home will be free from any defect due to noncompliance with
the building standards.
(2) Two years following the warranty commencement date,
the plumbing, electrical, heating, cooling, and ventilating systems
exclusive of any appliance, fixture, and equipment will be free
from any defect due to noncompliance with the building stand-
ards.
(3) Ten years following the warranty commencement date, the
home will be free from major structural defects due to non-
compliance with the building standards.8
The liberative prescription for each of these warranties is the time period
expressed plus thirty days.8 9 The exclusive remedies available to an owner
for a breach of the warranties by the builder are actual damages,
attorney's fees, and court costs. 90 Actual damages shall not exceed the
reasonable repair or replacement cost necessary to cure the defect (for
a single defect) nor shall they exceed the original purchase price of the
home. 91 Incidental expenses and consequential damages, including those
for personal injury, are not available. 92
for the purchasers and occupants of new homes." (emphasis added). La. R.S. 9:3143(7)
defines the "warranty commencement date" as "the date that legal title to a home is
conveyed to its initial purchaser or the date the home is first occupied, whichever occurs
first." In conjunction with this, La. R.S. 9:3144(A) defines the warranties provided by
the act, each of which run a specific period of time beginning with the warranty-com-
mencement date. It is reasonable to conclude that works such as a remodeled kitchen, a
new room, or new floor tile would not be included within these warranties which started
to run before the existence of the work sought to be warranted.
87. La. R.S. 9:3150 (Supp. 1987) provides in part: "This Chapter provides the exclusive
remedies, warranties, and prescriptive periods as between builder and owner relative to
home construction and no other provisions of law relative to warranties and redhibitory
vices and defects shall apply."
88. La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(1-3) (Supp. 1987).
89. La. R.S. 9:3146 (Supp. 1987).
90. La. R.S. 9:3149 (Supp. 1987).
91. Id.
92. La. R.S. 9:3144(14), (15), (17) (Supp. 1987).
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A full and complete analysis of the provisions of the "New Home
Warranty Act" is beyond the scope of this comment. The point to be
understood is that those transactions which fall within the scope of this
act and which may arguably be either a sale or a building contract, do
not require such a classification. As to those transactions which fall
outside the scope of this act, the significance of the distinction remains
viable.
E. Conclusion of Part II
With the exception of the "New Home Warranty Act," the above
discussion identifies three areas which are particularly impacted by dis-
tinguishing between building contracts and sales. These areas, among
others of less importance, 93 affect the rights and obligations of each of
the parties, and thus reflect the importance of correctly classifying a
contract as either a building contract or a sale.
Lee H. Ayres
93. For the proposition that the notion of "putting in default" does not apply to
building contract obligations, see Barber Bros. Contracting Co. v. Chet Homes, Inc., 393
So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So. 2d 921 (La. 1981). This case
involved Louisiana Civil Code articles 1912 and 1913 of the Code of 1870, the precursors
of article 1989 of the 1985 Revision. For the proposition that a vendor's lien cannot
coincide with a building contract, see Long Leaf Lumber, Inc. v. Summer Grove De-
velopers, Inc., 270 So. 2d 5F8 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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